The account manager
“They take the angry customer’s call, and they are the ones who most often end up over-explaining to calm the customer down.”
Article 24 of Law 10/2010 prohibits telling a customer that information has been reported (or is about to be reported) to SEPBLAC. It sounds obvious until a customer asks why their transaction has been delayed and someone on your team says too much.
Does your team know what it can and cannot say? Free assessment
We review your customer service script and your internal confidentiality workflow.
The prohibition of disclosure is breached by talking, not by writing. That is why the work is done with scripts and training, not just procedures.
We draft the section that governs who within the entity knows that a report exists, how the case file is flagged and what information may circulate by email, internal chat or CRM.
The team that deals with customers is the one that can disclose without meaning to. We prepare the response script and role-specific training, using real cases of conversations that got out of hand.
How the report is submitted without leaving a trail that the customer or third parties can access.
Stopping the transaction without explaining why: the hardest practical tension to manage.
What your KYC provider or your outsourced administrative firm (gestoría) may know, and under what contract.
What to do when a disclosure has already happened and the damage has to be contained.
Not only disclosing that a report has been made: also that the transaction is being examined.
Article 24 of Law 10/2010 prohibits obliged entities, and also their directors and employees, from disclosing to the customer or to third parties that information has been reported to SEPBLAC, or that a transaction is being examined—or may be examined—because it may be related to money laundering or terrorist financing.
This is what is known internationally as tipping off, and the reason for it is simple: if the person under investigation knows they are being watched, the investigation loses all its value. That is why the prohibition is not limited to a report that has already been made; it also covers the mere examination of the transaction, even if nothing is ever reported.
The prohibition has two sides that are worth keeping apart. Externally, no one on the team may hint to the customer at the real reason for a hold or for a request for documents. Internally, information must circulate on a need-to-know basis: the more people who know that a report is in progress, the more likely it is that someone will mention it where they should not.
The prohibition is not absolute, but the exceptions are strictly defined and narrow.
| Case | Scope | Condition | Practical safeguard |
|---|---|---|---|
| Within the same group | Sharing information between entities of the same corporate group | The group applies common AML/CFT policies and procedures | Document the group policy. Without it, the exchange is no longer covered. |
| Between financial institutions | Sharing between entities subject to EU AML rules or equivalent rules | It concerns the same customer and the same transaction, and a duty of secrecy applies | It does not cover general market inquiries or informal lists of blacklisted customers. |
| Between professionals | Lawyers, court representatives (procuradores), notaries, auditors and similar professionals | They practice within the same entity or network and act for the same client and transaction | The exception is narrow: same client and same transaction, not simply “the same firm”. |
| Dissuading from illegal activity | Trying to get the customer to refrain from carrying out an illegal activity | It is not disclosed that a report exists or will exist | It is the most useful exception and the easiest to overstep: you can say “no”; you cannot say “why”. |
| Requests from authorities | Providing information to judges, prosecutors, the criminal investigation police (policía judicial) or SEPBLAC itself | A legitimate request made in the exercise of their functions | Keep the request. It is your evidence of why the information was provided. |
Indicative table based on the wording of Article 24 of Law 10/2010. The exact scope of each exception should be checked against the current consolidated text before you rely on it.
A breach is almost never a document: it is a sentence said at the counter or on a call.
| Situation | What you must NOT say | What you can say | Risk if you get it wrong |
|---|---|---|---|
| The customer asks why their transaction is delayed | “It’s under review for money laundering,” “compliance has stopped it” | “We are completing an internal check on the transaction” | Direct disclosure |
| The customer asks why you are asking for documents | “Well, we got an alert” | “Our regulations require us to keep customer information up to date” | Indirect disclosure |
| The customer threatens to leave | “Well, we had to report your case” | “I understand your position; the procedure is the same for all customers” | Disclosure under pressure |
| A colleague from another department asks | “We’ve reported that customer” | Nothing. Refer them to the person in charge of the case file | Internal leak |
| A third party (the customer’s adviser, a correspondent bank) asks | Any reference to the examination or the report | That the inquiry must go through the proper formal channels | Disclosure to a third party |
| You decide to end the business relationship | “We’re closing your account over a money laundering issue” | The contractual ground for termination, with no reference to the examination or the report | Disclosure on exit |
The practical rule fits in one line: you can talk about the process, never about the reason. Anything that points to a suspicion, an alert or a report is off-limits.
The leak point changes depending on who deals directly with the customer.
“They take the angry customer’s call, and they are the ones who most often end up over-explaining to calm the customer down.”
“The closer the relationship with the client, the harder it is to maintain confidentiality without it showing.”
“The buyer, the seller and two agencies all asking at once: the perfect setting for indirect disclosure.”
“Support tickets and chats are answered quickly and in writing: one badly worded message stays on record forever.”
A breach of Article 24 is sanctioned in its own right and extends to the individuals who commit it.
Disclosure destroys the usefulness of the report. If the customer knows they are being watched, the information sent to SEPBLAC can no longer serve the purpose for which it was sent.
It is a stand-alone infringement under Law 10/2010 and extends personally to directors and employees, not only to the entity as a legal person.
And it is practically impossible to undo. Unlike other breaches, a disclosure cannot be remedied with an action plan: it can only be documented as an incident and contained.
| Severity | Amount | Basis or alternative |
|---|---|---|
| Minor infringements | up to €60,000 | Less significant breaches, or breaches with no appreciable impact on the AML/CFT system. |
| Serious infringements | €60,000 – €5,000,000 | Or 10% of the company’s total resources. |
| Very serious infringements | €150,000 – €10,000,000 | Or 10% of the entity’s own funds. |
We prepare the response script, role-based training and the internal need-to-know procedure so that a difficult conversation does not turn into sanction proceedings.
It is the English-language term for prohibited disclosure: warning the customer or a third party that a transaction has been reported, will be reported or is being examined because of its possible link to money laundering. In Spain it is governed by Article 24 of Law 10/2010.
No, and this is the point most often overlooked. The prohibition also covers the fact that a transaction is being examined or may be examined. In other words, you can breach Article 24 without having reported anything yet, simply by telling the customer that their transaction is under review.
Yes. You can refuse to execute it and you can end the business relationship. What you cannot do is link that refusal to a suspicion, an alert or a report. The law allows you to dissuade the customer from carrying out an illegal activity, but that does not entitle you to explain that there is a case in progress.
Only in the strictly defined cases: entities of the same group with common AML policies, or financial institutions subject to EU rules where the exchange concerns the same customer and the same transaction and a duty of secrecy applies. Outside those cases, an informal inquiry between compliance officers at different entities is a prohibited disclosure, however common the practice is in the sector.
It depends on the relationship. A provider acting as such must be contractually bound by an equivalent duty of confidentiality, and the information it receives must be limited to what it needs to provide the service. If you outsource AML functions, this must be expressly governed by the contract: we cover it on our AML outsourcing page.
Whatever your script says, and the script must be written and approved before the situation arises. Neutral wording that talks about the process and never about the reason: internal checks, updating information, regulatory requirements that apply to all customers. Improvisation is behind almost every disclosure.
Easily. An internal email forwarded to the customer, a CRM note visible from the customer portal, a comment on a support ticket or an overly explicit rejection reason in an automated notification. Reviewing the automated texts in your systems is one of the most cost-effective measures you can take.
Yes. Article 24 is addressed to obliged entities and to their directors or employees. The entity’s liability does not exclude that of the individual who makes the disclosure, which makes it especially important to be able to show that specific training on this point was given.
With the written need-to-know procedure, the approved script, role-based training records, restricted system access to reported case files and the incident log. The absence of incidents proves nothing on its own; documented controls do.
Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 keeps the prohibition of disclosure with the same scheme of strictly defined exceptions and makes it directly applicable law from July 10, 2027. For Spanish entities, the practical change is that the regime is harmonized across Member States, which is especially relevant for cross-border groups. More detail on our AMLR page.
You do not comply with Article 24 through a clause: you comply through scripts, system permissions and training. Ten steps that cover all three fronts.
The fewer people who know that a report exists, the lower the risk of a leak. Access to the reported case file must be restricted in the system, not just in the manual.
Three or four neutral phrasings, approved and distributed. Whoever deals with the customer should not have to make anything up on the spot.
Automated emails, rejection reasons, app notifications. This is where disclosure most often happens without anyone having spoken to anyone.
If you want to review the whole workflow, start with the AML manual or your team’s mandatory training.
Disclosure is almost never deliberate. These are the four ways it gets out.
1) The conversationIt is the main channel. An account manager who wants to help, a customer who insists and one explanation too many.
2) The systemRejection reasons, notification emails, statuses visible in the customer’s app. Nobody says a word, and the disclosure still happens.
3) The groupA very widespread practice, and one covered only in strictly defined cases. Outside them, it is disclosure to a third party, with all the consequences.
4) The exitClosing the account or dropping the engagement is legitimate. Explaining the real reason is not. It is the moment of greatest risk, because the customer demands reasons and there is no longer a relationship to preserve.
Quick decisionThree questions and the right answer to each.
“We are completing an internal check.” Allowed.
“We got a money laundering alert.” Prohibited.
“We will not be able to carry out this transaction.” Allowed, without explaining why.
A closed circle of people who know that a report exists.
System permissions matrix and the relevant section of the manual.
Approved neutral wording for typical situations.
Versioned, dated document distributed to the team.
No system template mentions alerts, reviews or reports.
Inventory of reviewed templates and review date.
Equivalent duty of confidentiality under contract.
Contract clause and register of providers with access.
Role-specific training, with a focus on customer service.
Content, attendance and assessment by department.
Any one of these indicates that Article 24 has not really been implemented.
Terms that appear in manuals, procedures and sanction proceedings.
Prohibits disclosing to the customer or third parties that an examination or a report exists or may take place.
Standard name for the same duty in the FATF framework and in EU legislation.
Operating principle that limits access to information to the smallest number of people strictly necessary.
You may try to get the customer to desist, without disclosing that a report exists or will exist.
Allowed between entities of the same group with common AML/CFT policies and procedures.
The fact whose existence cannot be disclosed. Both duties arise at the same time.
Stopping the transaction without being able to explain why is the central practical tension of Article 24.
A disclosure cannot be undone: it is documented as an incident, its cause is analyzed and the control is corrected.
Keeps the prohibition and harmonizes the exceptions at EU level from July 2027.
COMPLIANCE CONTROL CENTER · ART. 24
Cross who you are talking to with what you are going to tell them. The cell tells you whether you are on the right side of Article 24 or not.
Green: allowed. Amber: only with a supporting basis. Red: prohibited.
To all obliged entities and, personally, to their directors and employees.
We assess your position as an obliged entity and tailor the confidentiality script to the type of relationship you have with your customers.
The relationship of trust with the client makes it especially hard to maintain confidentiality without it becoming obvious.
Several parties asking at once about a deal that is not moving forward: the highest-risk scenario for indirect disclosure.
Automated texts and support tickets are the most common leak channel, and they leave a written record.
All of them recur at entities whose manuals are otherwise well built.
The prohibition also covers the examination of the transaction. Saying “we’re reviewing it for compliance” is already disclosure, even if you never end up reporting anything.
An automated notification that says “transaction rejected by anti-money laundering controls” discloses without anyone having spoken to the customer.
A very widespread practice in the sector, and one covered only in strictly defined cases. Outside them, it is disclosure to a third party.
If anyone on the team can see the report flag in the system, need to know does not exist.
Ending the relationship is the moment of greatest pressure and greatest risk. The letter must be a standard one, and it must be reviewed.
A disclosure that happened and was documented with its root-cause analysis shows a system that works. A disclosure that happened and was hushed up is an aggravating factor.
Direct links to the consolidated texts and to the competent bodies.
Consolidated text. Article 24: prohibition of disclosure and its exceptions.
BOEImplementing regulations of Law 10/2010.
EUR-LexKeeps and harmonizes the prohibition of disclosure from July 2027.
SEPBLACSpain’s financial intelligence unit.
FATFThe international standard that the concept of tipping off comes from.
TreasuryInstitutional information and the sanctions regime.
Initial publication, with a practical customer response script and treatment under the AMLR.
Planned review: application of Regulation (EU) 2024/1624.
Tell us how your team currently answers when a customer asks about a transaction on hold.
The prohibition of disclosure—known internationally as tipping off—is set out in Article 24 of Law 10/2010 of April 28 on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. It prevents obliged entities, and also their directors and employees, from disclosing to the customer or to third parties that information has been reported to SEPBLAC or that a transaction is being examined—or may be examined—because of its possible link to money laundering or terrorist financing.
Reading the provision narrowly—as if it only protected the fact that a report has been made—is wrong, and it lies behind a large share of breaches. The rule also covers the earlier stage: the internal analysis of a transaction. An entity can breach Article 24 without having filed any report at all, simply by telling the customer that the compliance department is reviewing their transaction.
The provision allows certain exchanges of information that are not treated as disclosure: between entities of the same group that apply common AML/CFT policies and procedures; between financial institutions subject to EU or equivalent rules, where the exchange concerns the same customer and the same transaction and a duty of secrecy applies; and between professionals (lawyers, procuradores, notaries, auditors) who practice within the same entity or network and act for the same client and transaction. Attempting to dissuade the customer from carrying out an illegal activity is also allowed, provided that the existence or possibility of a report is not disclosed.
Article 24 applies at precisely the most uncomfortable moment: when the transaction has been stopped under the duty to refrain and the customer demands an explanation. This tension is structural, and good will does not resolve it. It requires a response script drafted and approved in advance, and specific training for staff who deal directly with customers. Improvising in front of an insistent customer is by far the most common cause of improper disclosure.
Unlike other AML/CFT obligations, Article 24 is also expressly addressed to directors and employees. This means that the entity’s liability does not displace that of the individual who makes the disclosure. As a result, evidencing compliance necessarily means showing three things: that a need-to-know procedure was implemented in the system, that an approved script had been distributed, and that specific training on this point was given to the staff most exposed. You can see how this fits into the overall system in the AML manual.
Key legislation, linked to the official text:
Legislation and links reviewed in .